We propose a simple model of the banking system incorporating a game feature where the evolution of monetary reserve is modeled as a system of coupled Feller diffusions. The Markov Nash equilibrium generated through minimizing the linear quadratic cost subject to Cox-Ingersoll-Ross type processes creates liquidity and deposit rate. The adding liquidity leads to a flocking effect but the deposit rate diminishes the growth rate of the total monetary reserve causing a large number of bank defaults. In addition, the corresponding Mean Field Game and the infinite time horizon stochastic game with the discount factor are also discussed.
Introduction
The recent financial crisis motivates the research on systemic risk. Central to this research is constructing a safe banking system that alerts investors to possible systemic risk and tackle a financial crisis should it occur. However, due to the complexity of connection between banks, systemic risk is often unpredictable and unmeasurable. Hence, in order to better understand the banking system and systemic risk, we propose a model of interbank lending and borrowing with a game feature where the evolution of monetary reserve is driven by a system of interacting Feller diffusions and the default is simply defined as the zero monetary reserve as studied by Fouque and Ichiba [2013] . Each bank controls its own rate of lending to or borrowing from the central bank to minimize its cost or maximize its profit. The spirit of optimal strategy with respect to the object function is that each bank intends to borrow when its monetary value falls below a critical level (the averaged capitalization) and to lend when its monetary value remains above the critical level. Intuitively, banks intend to maximize their borrowing or lending activities during a fixed period. Hence, referring to , we restrict the monetary amount that banks borrow from or lend to a central bank at the fixed incentive rate determined by individual banks or a regulator. To this end, we apply a quadratic cost function. The exact Markov Nash equilibrium for a linear quadratic regulator in the both finite and infinite time horizon and subject to Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) type processes is obtained by a system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. In addition, we solve for ǫ-Nash equilibrium in the mean field limit using the coupled backward Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and the forward Kolmogorov equation for the value function and distribution of dynamics. Given the feature of CIR type processes, the admissibility of the equilibrium is worth to be discussed. From a financial perspective, compared to case of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) type processes proposed in , due to the volatility driven by the squared root function of states, the Markov Nash equilibrium generated by CIR type processes creates not only liquidity but deposit rate impairing the growth rate leading to the system instability such that a regulator must govern the growth rate by controlling the corresponding lending/borrowing incentive to prevent system crash.
Such interactions leading to multiple defaults is investigated by other mathematical models in continuous time. Fouque and Sun [2013] , comment on systemic risk using the interacting OU type processes. Garnier et al. [2013a,b] study the rare events in the potential bistable model based on large deviation results. Mean Field Games (MFGs) proposed by Lions [2006a,b, 2007] are applied frequently to obtain the asymptotic equilibria called ǫ-Nash equilibria of stochastic differential games with interactions given by empirical distributions whose solution satisfies the strongly coupled HJB equations backward in time and the Kolmogorov equations forward in time. Independently, Caines, Huang, and Malhamé develop a similar scenario called the Nash Certainty equivalence. See Huang et al. [2006 Huang et al. [ , 2007 for instance. Instead of the partial differential equation (PDE) approach, Bensoussan et al. [2016] , Carmona et al. [2013] , Carmona and Lacker [2015] consider the probabilistic approach using appropriate forms of adjoint forwardbackward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) to solve ǫ-Nash equilibria satisfying the Pontryagin stochastic minimum principle. In particular, Lacker and Webster [2015] , Lacker [2016] study MFGs with common noise. Due to the volatility in Feller diffusions driven by the square-root function of states, the sufficient Pontryagin minimum principle is not straightforward to be applied. Hence, we tackle the optimization problem using the HJB approach.
Consider N banks that lend to and borrow from each other. Their monetary reserves are represented by a system of diffusion processes X i t for i = 1, · · · , N driven by N independent standard Brownian motions W i t , i = 1, · · · , N . The initial values of the system may be nonnegative squared integrable and identically distributed random variables X i 0 = ξ i for i = 1, · · · , N independent of the Brownian motions. The model is written as
where the nonnegative growth rate or income rate γ t for the individual bank is a deterministic function in L ∞ space and the lending preference, or rate of lending and borrowing is normalized by the number of banks with 0 ≤ a ≤ N . Referring to Fouque and Ichiba [2013] , we further assume the diffusion parameter equal to 2 identical to squared Bessel processes in order to simplify the analysis of system stability. The drift terms represent interactions between the banks; specifically they define the borrowing or lending rate of bank i from or to bank j. The simple lending and borrowing can be rewritten in the mean field form as
where X t = 1 N N j=1 X j t represents the averaged capitalization whereby bank i ∈ {1, · · · , N } chooses its own optimization strategy α i for optimizing its lending and borrowing rates to/from the central bank at initial time by minimizing the quadratic cost
where X = (X 1 , · · · , X N ), x = (x 1 , · · · , x N ), α = (α 1 , · · · , α N ). Note that α · is a progressively measurable control process and
The running cost and the terminal cost are defined as
where q, c, and ǫ are positive parameters and q 2 ≤ ǫ in order to satisfy the convexity condition of the running cost f i (x, α). Note that q controls the borrowing and lending incentive and the case of X i t ≤ X t gives α i t ≥ 0 denoting that bank i intends to borrow. Conversely, when X i t > X t , the negative strategy α i t < 0 implies a lending intention by bank i. In addition, ǫ and c are treated as the parameters for the running penalty and the terminal penalty respectively implying that banks intends to hold their own reserves close to the average capitalization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the simple uncontrolled constant growth rate of interbank lending and borrowing. The behavior of the system is studied using the results of Fouque and Ichiba [2013] . Section 3 is devoted to solving the Markov Nash equilibria of the stochastic differential games and the ǫ-Nash equilibria in the mean field limit. We implement the coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations in Markovian models. The financial implication is illustrated at the end of this section. The infinite time horizon with the discount factor and its influence on the system crash and multiple defaults are analyzed in Section 4. The conclusion is provided in Section 5 and the verification theorems for both finite and infinite time horizons are given in the appendix.
Interbank Lending System
In this section, we discuss the simple model of lending and borrowing without controls. In this model, bank i has a monetary reserve X i t with a constant growth rate γ written as
where the lending preference is a fixed normalized constant a N ≤ 1 treated as one particular case in Fouque and Ichiba [2013] . Consequently, the total monetary reserve Y t = N i=1 X i t is given by
where W t is a standard Brownian motion in some extension probability space by Lévy theorem referring to Theorem 3.4.2 of Karatzas and Shreve [1998] . We straightforwardly apply the results of Fouque and Ichiba [2013] (See also Chapter 6 of Jeanblanc et al. [2009] for instance) as follows:
• System crash 1. If γ > 2 N , systemic risk never happens owing to the total monetary reserve Y never reaching zero:
2. If γ = 2 N , we obtain P(lim sup
and the system survivals since the total reserve X remains positive . However, due to
the shrinking of the total reserve to almost nothing leads to a financial crisis at some point in the future almost surely.
3. If 0 < γ < 2 N , the total monetary reserve Y violates the property (8) but satisfies property (9). Under this condition, the total monetary reserve Y reaches zero almost surely at some large time and reflects instantaneously at that point. Therefore, all banks face defaults in the future 4. If γ = 0, the total monetary reserve Y approaches to zero within some finite time. At this time, all banks default at some time and thereafter remain at zero almost surely.
• Given a identical growth rate γ and a symmetric lending preference a/N , the stochastic stability of the process X i t − X t for all t ≥ 0 is guaranteed, Under this condition, the matrix-valued process (X i t − X j t ) 1≤i,j≤N is also stochastically stable using Proposition 2.4 and Corollary 2.1 in Fouque and Ichiba [2013] .
Here, we apply the Euler scheme to plot a typical realization of N = 10 trajectories of (5) up to time T = 100 with a time step ∆ = 10 −4 and a fixed at 10. The growth rate γ is varied as 0.2 and 0 in Figure 1 and as 2 and 0 in Figure 2 . Note that the trajectories are grouped by the mean reverting rate a = 10. This flocking behavior leads to stability at the larger growth rate creates stability but systemic risk at the smaller growth rate. Figure 1 shows that due to γ = 0.2, the growth rate of total monetary reserve Y t is 2 satisfying the Figure 1: One realization of N = 10 trajectories of (5) with γ = 0.2 (left plot) and with γ = 0 (right plot). The common mean-reverting rate a is fixed at 10. Figure 2: One realization of N = 10 trajectories of (5) with γ = 2 (left plot) and with γ = 0 (right plot). The common mean-reverting rate a is fixed at 10. condition (9) so that we observe the shrinking scenario in the sense that Y t becomes small in this particular realization. The monetary reserve X i t can be rewritten as
where X i t is mean-reverting at the averaged capitalization 1 N Y t . The previous discussion implies that lending and borrowing behaviors create stability when γ > 2 N but incur systemic risk when 0 ≤ γ ≤ 2 N . In addition, similarly to the model in , the number of banks N plays an important role in the system. In coupled OU processes, a large N mitigates systemic risk since the probability of the leading averaged capitalization reaching the default barrier (i.e. entering a systemic event) decays with order √ N . The systemic event triggering a system crash occurs independently of the mean-reverting rate a. On the other hand, in interacting Feller diffusions, the system crash occurs through the total monetary reserve of the interacting Feller diffusions driven by N γ. The probability of all defaults diminishes meaning that the survival probability of the system increases under a strong growth rate γ and a large N . Note that this probability is independent of the lending preference a/N . Hence, in the case of the coupled system with an identical lending preference, for the propose of preventing systemic risk or multiple defaults, a regulator must expend the number of individuals and encourage lending and borrowing behavior.
Construction of Nash Equilibria
We now return to the model with a game feature proposed in Section 1. The monetary reserve of bank i is written as
where the growth rate nonnegative γ t is a deterministic function in L ∞ space and the initial value X i 0 = ξ i may be a nonnegative square-integrable and identically distributed random variable independent of Brownian motions. Each bank attempts to minimize
where X = (X 1 , · · · , X N ), x = (x 1 , · · · , x N ), α = (α 1 , · · · , α N ) and
and q 2 ≤ ǫ ensuring that f i (x, α) is convex in (x, α) and
HJB Approach
Referring to the discussion in Chapter 5 of Carmona [2016] , in the Markovian setting, the Markov Nash equilibrium can be explicitly solved via the HJB equations. As banks intend to minimize their costs, given the optimal strategiesα j for j = i with the corresponding trajectoriesX −i = (X 1 , · · · ,X i−1 ,X i+1 , · · · ,X N ), the value function of bank i is written as
Hence, the HJB equation for solving for the Markov Nash equilibrium suggested by the dynamic programming principle reads
Here,α j for all j = i denote the optimal strategies of bank j for all j = i. We minimize (13) with respect to α i leading to the resulting strategy for player iα
Inserting the optimal strategy candidate (14) into the HJB equation (13), (13) becomes
We now make the following ansatz for
with terminal conditions η c T = c, L c T = 0, φ c T = 0, and µ c T = 0. Solving this system, we get
where we use the notation
with
and
Observe that η t is well defined for any t ≤ T given by the negative denominator of (17) . Therefore, using (16), the corresponding optimal strategy for bank i is written aŝ
which is also the Markov Nash equilibrium. We write the corresponding dynamic X i t for i = 1, · · · , N as
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T leading to the drift coefficient of X bounded below by γ t −ψ c t ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Based on Proposition 2.1 in Fouque and Ichiba [2013] , the existence and uniqueness of the weak solution to X i for i = 1, · · · , N given by (24) in the positive polyhedral domain [0, ∞) N can be obtained. Hence, we verify the admissibility of the Markov Nash equilibriumα i for i = 1, · · · , N .
The financial interpretation of the assumption (26) is that banks are forbidden from leaving more deposits than their monetary growth through an appropriate incentive q imposed by a regulator. The condition (27) mentions that the number of banks in the interbank lending system is large enough. In order to verify that V i given by (16) is the value function and the corresponding optimal strategy isα i written as (23), we study the verification theorem given by Theorem 1 in Appendix A.
Below, we study the ǫ-Nash equilibria and defer the financial implications to Section 3.3.
ǫ-Nash Equilibria: Mean Field Games
In MFGs, we solve the ǫ-Nash equilibria in the mean field limit N → ∞. According to the steps in , we first fix (m t ) t≥0 as a candidate for the limit
and solve the one-player standard control problem
with the nonnegative deterministic growth rate γ t in L ∞ space where W t is a standard Brownian motion independent of the initial value X 0 = ξ which may be a nonnegative square integrable random variable. Finally, we obtain m t such that m t = E[X t ] for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Given the candidate m t , the corresponding HJB equation to the problem (29-30) is written as
(31) The first order condition leads to optimal strategy given bŷ
Plugging (32) into (31) implying
and then using the ansatz V m (t,
we obtain that η m t , L m t , and µ m t must satisfẏ
with terminal conditions η m T = c, L m T = 0, φ m T = 0, and µ m T = 0 leading to
where we again use the notation
Hence, the ǫ-Nash equilibrium is given bŷ
with deposit rate ψ t = −L t ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T and the corresponding dynamic X t is driven by
We obtain that m t = E(X t ) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T written as
where we assume γ t − ψ t ≥ 0 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T . The ǫ-Nash equilibrium (32) is the exact limit of the Markov equilibrium in the finite player games (23) as N → ∞. Hence, we naturally regard the ǫ-Nash equilibrium as an asymptotic solution of the optimal strategy for bank i written asα i t = (q + η t )(X t − X i t ) − ψ t , satisfying a + q + η t ≤ N for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T in order to guarantee admissibility referring to Proposition 2.1 in Fouque and Ichiba [2013] . The mean field limit m t simply is replaced from the averaged capitalization X t .
Remark 1. The Markov Nash equilibrium and the ǫ-Nash equilibrium are also obtained using the Dynamic programming-Carathéodory approach. In fact, since the HJB approach gives the equilibrium explicitly in Section 3.1, the Dynamic programming-Carathéodory approach is treated as a verification theorem. However, in the non-Markovian case, we apply this approach to solve the equilibrium. See Alekal et al. [1971] , Chen and Wu [2011] , Huang et al. [2012] , and Carmona et al. for instance.
Financial Implications
This subsection is devoted to analysis of the model (10-11). We use the Markov Nash equilibria identical to the ǫ-Nash equilibria. Given the strategy of bank i,
the dynamics of bank i are expressed as
and the total monetary
where W t is a standard Brownian motion in some extension probability space.
• According to the analysis in Section 2, we imposes the instability condition
and discuss the tail probability of all defaults based on the total monetary reserve Y t and its corresponding first passage time τ = inf{t > 0; Y t = 0}. Due to Y t driven by the time-dependent drift, the explicit solution of tail probability P(τ > T ) is not obtained in the literature. Therefore, we consider the estimation of the tail probability of all defaults. To this end, defineτ = inf{t > 0;Ŷ t = 0} andτ = inf{t > 0;Y t = 0} with corresponding dynamics
and Applying the comparison theorem studied in Göing-Jaeschkeing-Jaeschke and Yor [2003] , Ikeda and Watanabe [1977] , Elworthy et al. [1999] , we estimate the tail probability of all defaults as
for T ≥ t where Γ(x, s) :=
x 0 u s−1 e −u du for s > 0, and x ≥ 0.
• Though the rebalanced growth rate γ t − ψ c t and the symmetric lending preference A t /N are not purely constants but deterministic homogeneous functions where
we still apply Proposition 2.4 and Corollary 2.1 in Fouque and Ichiba [2013] . The stochastic stability of process X i t −X t and the matrix-valued process (X i t −X j t ) 1≤i,j≤N for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T can be qualified through the identity of γ t − ψ c t and A t /N .
As the results obtained in , the objective function (11) yields an increasing liquidity qualified by the larger rate of lending and borrowing given by (39). The fully symmetric lending and borrowing model leads to the Nash equilibrium independent of the growth rate γ t but according to the discussion in Section 2, the growth rate γ t plays an important role as a stabilizer for the system. In particular, due to the volatility driven by the square root function of states written as X i t , under the optimal strategy (35), bank i intends to borrow less money from the central bank or to lend it more money. In this way, it manipulates its own reserve through the positive deposit rate appearing in the drift as shown in Figure 3 and 4 in order to minimize the quadratic cost with a smaller volatility. Note that when T is large, η c t is treated as a constant and ψ c t increases almost linearly with t. Hence, the central bank acts as a central deposit corporation rather than a clearing house. However, noting that the growth rate diminishes through the deposit rate ψ c t , referring to the results in Fouque and Ichiba [2013] , we observe that the equilibrium creates the possibility of all defaults. Consequently, under the stability condition inf 0≤t≤T
increasing liquidity leads to stability. However, if the system remains in the worse-case scenario given by
the interbank lending and borrowing system may face immediate systemic risk due to the large liquidity. Therefore, from the regulator's point of view, the system is stable only when the deposit rate ψ c t satisfies the stability condition (42). Consequently, the regulator must control the incentive q and the running penalty ǫ such that condition (42) and P(Y t = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T ) = 0 hold meaning that impossibility of system crash in the fixed time period. In fact, a regulator may propose the restricted admissible set of the equilibrium written as for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , X j,α i t ≥ 0, ∀j = 1, · · · , N and Y α t > 0 a.s.,
leading to the weaker stability condition
As an example, we discuss the MFG case N → ∞ without lending and borrowing impositions and the terminal cost penalty that is, a = c = 0, and identify the sufficient conditions that satisfy (42).
Proposition 1. Given the constant growth rate γ t = γ, N → ∞ and a = c = 0, if the incentive q satisfies
for fixed ǫ or if the running penalty ǫ satisfies
for fixed q, the stability condition (42) holds.
Proof. As N → ∞, the deposit rate becomes ψ t = −L t . Using
and consequently
Since ψ c t = −L t and γ − ψ c t = γ + L t is bounded from below by γ + 2 1 − ǫ q 2 , a sufficient condition that guarantees condition (42) holds is given by
or for fixed q, the running penalty ǫ satisfies
According to Proposition 1, given the running penalty ǫ, a regulator must impose a minimum incentive q of √ 2ǫ √ γ+2 to satisfy (42) leading to the avoidance of system crash during the fixed time period.
Nash Equilibria: Case of the Infinite Time Horizon
The aim of this section is to investigate the case of the infinite time horizon stochastic game. We extend the quadratic cost proposed by in the infinite time horizon given a discount factor e −rt and a constant growth rate γ ≥ 0 and study the behavior of the corresponding adding liquidity and deposit rate influenced by the discount rate r and the incentive q respectively. Adopting the notations in Section 3.1, given the optimal strategieŝ α j for j = i, the value function of bank i is written as
where
and q 2 ≤ ǫ so that f i (x, α) is convex in (x, α) subject to the dynamics
with the initial X i 0 = ξ i identical to (10). Similarly, in the Markovian setting, the HJB equation reads
whereα j for all j = i represent the optimal strategies for bank j for all j = i. The first order condition yields the strategŷ
and the solution to the value function V i is given by
where η, L, φ, and µ satisfy
leading to the solutions
Hence, the Markov Nash equilibrium strategyα i is written aŝ
The individual monetary reserve X i t and the total monetary reserve Y t = N i=1 X i t are given by
where W t is defined in Section 2. Similarly, in order to guarantee the regularity condition of the total monetary reserve (53) and the admissibility of the optimal strategiesα i for i = 1, · · · , N , using Proposition 2.1 Fouque and Ichiba [2013], we assume
The corresponding financial interpretation is discussed in Section 3. We verify that V i and α i is the solution to the problem (43-44) through Theorem 2 in Appedix A .
Based on the results in Section 2, we now consider the re-balanced growth rate γ − ψ as a critical value to determine the possibility of system crash. In the case of γ − ψ > 2 N , systemic risk is always avoided. In the case of γ − ψ = 2 N , banks will face a future crisis. In the case of 0 < γ − ψ < 2 N , all banks will default at some large time and the total monetary reserve reflects at the point {0}. In the case of γ − ψ = 0, all banks will default within a the finite time and remain at zero almost surely.
In addition, owing to homogeneity of the value function (43), we obtain the identical growth rate γ − ψ and the symmetric lending preference A/N where A = a + q + (1 − 1 N )η. Similarly, Proposition 2.4 and Corollary 2.1 in Fouque and Ichiba [2013] ensure stochastic stability of the process X i t − X t and the matrix-valued process (X i t − X j t ) 1≤i,j≤N for all t ≥ 0.
Proposition 2. For fixed a ≥ 0, ǫ ≥ 0, and the discount rate r ≥ 0, given the incentive 0 ≤ q ≤ √ ǫ, the first derivative of η with respect to q is
Proof. It suffices to show
which is equivalent to show that
Consequently, we obtain
For fixed a ≥ 0, ǫ ≥ 0, and q ≥ 0, η given by (47) is a decreasing function of r. According to (48) and (49), we obtain
Inserting φ into (57) and canceling η, ψ becomes
By Proposition 2, a large q creates a small deposit rate. In addition, observe that a large r also suppresses the slight deposit rate. Therefore, a regulator must impose the restrictions on both the incentive and the discount rate to satisfy stability condition ψ(q, r) < γ − 2 N and hence facilitate the avoidance of all defaults. For example, assuming N → ∞ with a = 0, for any given r and ǫ, a regulator must impose a lower bound on the incentive q as
if ǫ ≥ 1 4 γ 2 + 1 2 γ r 2 or q ≥ 0, otherwise. These constraints will ensure the stability condition ψ(q, r) < γ − 2 N and the permanent survival of the inter-bank system.
Conclusion
We study the linear quadratic regulator subject to the coupled CIR type diffusions. Given some regularity conditions, the admissible Markov Nash equilibrium creates system instability since the deposit rate given by the equilibrium diminishes the individual growth rate. A regulator must govern the growth rate of the ensemble total in order to prevent system crash. This problem can be extended in some directions. First, the behavior of simple lending and borrowing can be replaced with the system under relative performance concern proposed by Espinosa and Touzi [2015] . Second, it would be interesting to study the delay obligation based on the system referring to Carmona et al.. Due to the character of CIR type processes, we must tackle the admissibility of the equilibrium. Third, an individual bank may have a more restricted admissible set satisfying When α t is replaced byα t in (10), we denote the solution bỹ
When α t is replaced byα t in (10), we denote the solution bŷ
We want to prove the following. For any admissible strategyα, we have
and forα, we have
Using (58) and (59) implies thatα i is an optimal strategy for i-th bank when other banks useα j , j = i as their strategies. We first consider (58) and (10) for α t =α t . We can assume that
otherwise, (58) holds automatically. Define the exit time
Under (60), we shall prove the following properties:
We postpone the proof of (61) and (62). We now prove (58). Givenα j by (23) for all j = i, applying Itó's formula on V i (s,X s ), we obtain
and then
Taking the expectation on both sides and using
Together with (61), we obtain as M → ∞
We note
since the integrand is nonnegative. Putting the above results together, we can obtain
This completes the proof of (58).
the monetary reserve for i-th bank isX i t which is governed by the equation
the total monetary reserveỸ t is written as
is a Brownian motion. Under the conditions (26) and (27), according to the Proposition 2.1 in Fouque and Ichiba [2013] , we haveX i t ≥ 0 almost surely for i = 1, · · · , N . This implies the admissibility of the strategyα and the regularity of the total monetary reserveŶ t . Using the above argument ( for the estimates ofỸ t ,X i t ), we can show, for a suitable β > 0,
by considering the Ito's formula forŶ 2 s (see (67)). Then we can also show,
Then as (65), we can derive
That is,α i is an optimal strategy for i-th bank whenα j , j = i are used for j-th bank. The proof is complete.
Theorem 2. Given the optimal strategiesα j written as (51) for all j = i, V i andα i given by (46) and (51) respectively are the value function and the corresponding optimal strategy which is also the Markov Nash equilibrium associated to the problem (43-44).
Proof. Adopting the notations in Theorem 1, denoteα as an admissible strategy written as
Similarly, when α t is replaced byα t in (10), the solution is written as
and when α t is replaced byα t in (10), the solution is given bŷ
We again need to verify that for any admissible strategyα, the solution V i satisfies
and forα.
The equations (71) and (72) lead toα i is an optimal strategy for i-th bank givenα j for j = i as their strategies. For the proof of (71), we can assume that
or θ M = +∞ if X t never exit for all t ≥ 0. Given the optimal strategiesα j written as (51) for all j = i, using Itó's formula on e −rt V i , we obtain
Taking the expectation of both sides and using
Using the ansatz V i given by (46) gives
Hence, according to the results in Theorem 1, when taking the limit as M → ∞, we get the uniform integrability of V i .
Referring to Chapter III.9 in Fleming and Soner [2006] , using φ + L > 0, we obtain V i ≥ 0 satisfying lim sup T →∞ e −rT EV i (X T ) ≥ 0,
leading to
We now need to verify lim inf T →∞ e −rT EV i (X T ) = 0,
implying
Recalling V i (X s ) = η 2 (X s −X i s ) 2 + L(X s −X i s ) + φX s + µ, since f i (X s , α i s ) ≥ (ǫ − q 2 )(X s −X i s ) 2 , f i (X s , α i s ) ≥ We need to show lim T →∞ e −rT E[X T ] = 0.
Since
whereW is a Brownian motion (see the argument in Theorem 1), we have SinceỸ T = NX T , putting the above results together, we can obtain lim T →∞ e −rT E[X T ] = 0.
Hence, the above results gives (78). Finally, referring to Proposition 2. 1 Fouque and Ichiba [2013] , the conditions (54) and (55) give the regularity condition of the total monetary reserve (53) and the admissibility of the optimal strategiesα i for i = 1, · · · , N . This proves that V i is the value function and α i is an optimal strategy.
